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For Your Thought 
Remember that first day at Law School when the 
Dean told the incoming class that the Law was to be 
your new mistress? Perhaps it would do well to 
take the time to reflect on just what is meant by this 
imagery. To guide you on your journey the 
following was part of a speech given by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in 1885. 
faculties by which man is likest to a god. Those 
who, having begun the pursuit, turn away un-
charmed, do so either because they have not been 
vouchsafed the sight of her divine figure, or because 
they have not the heart for so great a struggle. To 
the lover of the law, how small a thing seem the 
novelist's tales of the loves and fates of Daphnis 
and Chloe"l How pale a phantom even the Circe of 
poetry, transforming mankind with intoxicating 
dreams of fiery ether, and the foa"m of summer seas, 
and glowing greensward, and the white arms of 
womenl For him no less a history will suffice than 
that of the moral life of his race. For him every text 
that he deciphers, every doubt that he resolves, 
adds a new feature to the unfolding panorama of 
man's destiny upon this earth. Nor will his task be 
done until, by the farthest stretch of human 
imagination, he has seen as with his eyes the birth 
and growth of society, and by the farthest stretch of 
reason he has understood the philosophy of its 
being. When I think thus of the law, I see a princess 
mightier than she who once wrought at Bayeux, 
eternally weaving into her web dim figures of the 
ever-lengthening past - figures too dim to be 
noticed by the idle, too symbolic to be interpreted 
except by her pupils, but to the discerning eye 
disclosing every painful step and every world-
shaking contest by which mankind has worked and 
fought its way from savage isolation to organic 
socia I life." § 
"And what a profession it isl No doubt 
everyth i ng is i nteresti ng when it is understood and 
seen in its connection with the rest of things. Every 
calling is great when greatly pursued. But what 
other gives such scope to realize the spontaneous 
energy of one's soul? In what other does one 
plunge so deep in the stream of life-so share its 
passions, its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both 
as witness and actor? 
"But that is not all. What a subject is this in 
which we are united - this abstraction called the 
Law, wherein, as in a magic mirror, we see reflec-
ted, not only our own lives, but the lives of all men 
that have been! When I think on this majestic 
theme, my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the 
law as our mistress, we who are here know that she 
is a mistress only to be wooed with sustained and 
lonely passion - only to be won by straining all the 
News 
No sooner had the Law 
School Association let it be 
known that Association members 
were about to inaugurate the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
Annual Fund than the Board of 
Visitors of the College offered a 
challenge to alumni and friends 
of the Law School in the form of 
authorization for the expenditure 
of $25,000 from endowment for 
the purpose of purchasing books 
for the Law School Library. 
The Board took this step to 
"provide tangible en-
couragement to the William and 
Mary Law School Association to 
raise an equal amount from at 
least 50% of its membership." 
In announcing the establish-
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ment of the Fund, the Association 
indicated that it intends to assist 
the School on a yearly, 
sustained basis. Contributions 
will be sought for several im-
portant aspects of the School's 
program of modern legal 
education. The funds will be used 
for areas of the program where 
the Commonwealth of Virginia 
does not appropriate money or 
where support supplementary to 
the Commonwealth's substantial 
efforts is necessary. 
Gifts to the fund are to be 
used at the discretion of the 
Dean for the following purposes: 
Improvement of the Law Library, 
financial assistance to students, 
and faculty development. 
One of the important goals of 
the Law School is the develop-
ment of greater depth and 
breadth in the Law Library 
collection. I ncreased student 
enrollment has made necessary 
multiple copies of many of the 
standard reference works, and 
the expanded curriculum 
requires library resources in the 
new areas of study. 
The ability to offer more 
scholarship aid to students on 
admission is another critical 
area of need at the Law School 
in order to enable Marshall-
Wythe to compete for out-
standing applicants with the bet-
ter endowed schools. Students 
already enrolled frequently seek 
financial assistance in order to 
enable them to finish their 
education. 
The third field in which this 
year's Annual Fund will be used 
is faculty development. Ample 
funds for research and at-
tendance at professional 
meetings are required to assure 
the continuing strength of the 
Law School faculty. The Com-
monwealth provides no General 
Fund appropriations for faculty 
research, and the amount of 
money made available for other 
professional development has 
not kept pace with the dramatic 
growth of the faculty in the last 
few years. 
Alumni and friends will soon 
be contacted by Mr. D. Wayne 
O'Bryan, President of the Law 
School Association, and his 
corps of volunteers. Mr. 
O'Bryan's letter to alumni and 
friends appeals to them to 
"assist in consolidating the 
remarkable gains of the Low 
School in :recent years and to en-
courage the further pursuit of ex-
cellence." He indicated that 
checks should be mode payable 
to WILLIAM AND MARY-LAW 
SCHOOL and sent to Box EH, 
Williamsburg, Va., 23185. § 
Faculty 
Profiles 
SCOTT C. WHITNEY 
As conservation becomes a 
greater problem of man, it 
begins to become more a 
problem of men of the legal 
profession. Mr. Whitney has 
been interested in wildlife and 
conservation for many years and 
has now become a professor at 
MarshQU-Wythe in order that he 
may instruct students about this 
growing problem. 
Mr. Whitney has received 
degrees from the University of 
Nevada, George Washington 
University, American University 
and his J.D. from Harvard Low 
School. He is also a member of 
many societies and clubs which 
deal with problems of con-
servation, including the Ex-
plorers Club, Shikar Safari Club 
International and the In-
ternational Wildlife Con-
servation SOciety. Mr. Whitney 
has also several years of 
professional experience and also 
presently, while teaching 
fu IIti me, advises the lieutena nt 
Governor of Virginia on local 
conservation problems. 
In teaching environmental law 
at Marshall-Wythe Mr. Whitney 
tries to get his students to un-
derstand the problems of con-
.servation versus the energy 
demand of our country. He 
believes that a study of en-
vironmental problems requires a 
balanced approach and a study 
of its impact on society as it is 
today and into the futu reo 
Through affirmative planning this 
problem can be solved and the 
solving this problem is the con-
cern of Mr. Whitney in his En-
vironmental Low Classes. § 
WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR. 
Doctor Williams comes to the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Low 
after serving as on international 
low specialist in Belgium 
assigned in support of the 
Supreme Headquarters, Allied 
Personal, Europe. As a scholar 
of international low, Dr. 
Williams is becoming on in-
tegral port of our low school as 
it expands in size and quality. 
Dr. Williams received his 
S.J.D., and his LLM. Degrees in 
Low from Yale University after 
receiving a LLB. Degree from 
the University of Southern 
California. Doctor Williams also 
has a Moster of Arts Degree in 
the field of foreig n affa irs. He 
received the 1970 Ambrose 
Gherini Prize from Yale for his 
doctoral dissertation upon which 
his book, Intergovernmental 
Military Forces and World 
Public Order, is based. 
The field of international low 
is a brood and interacting 
system of values and claims. Dr. 
Williams feels that low is a 
process of decision making 
arises out of the interactions of 
the i nternationa I SOciety. The 
"trends" of this decision process 
are that which Dr. Williams, as 
a professor, wishes to teach to 
his students. By analyzing these 
"trends" with his students, Dr. 
Williams feels that he is able to 
help a student find his way 
through the maze, thus causing a 
student to be able to apply the 
low of today, with the trends of 
today, for the low of tomorrow. 
§ 
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THE NEED FOR REVISION OF 
VIRGINIA'S JUVENILE COURT STATUTE 
The idea for this article was stimulated by two 
articles which appeared in the Spring, 1972, issue 
of the Colonial Lawyer. In one, Mike Inman, now a 
third-year student at the law School, described at 
some length the "eruption" of the prisoners' rights 
and prison reform movement in this country during 
the last three or four years. For various reasons, 
these two movements-sometimes reinforcing each 
other, sometimes not-have seized upon the judicial 
process as the pri ma ry tool of reform; as a resu It 
the federal district courts and to an increasing 
degree the state courts are swamped by the habeas 
corpus and civil rights! actions of convicted of-
fenders. I n the second article, a colleague of mine 
at the law School, Dick Williamson, makes a strong 
case, with which I generally agree, for his 
proposition that the "slow, cumbersome process" of 
adjudication is not the only and certainly not the 
best "vehicle through which one can achieve social 
change working within the system." As Mr. Inman 
also concludes, this observation is, at least in some 
instances, particularly applicable to the prisoner 
rights and prison reform movements. 
Having spent several years in correctional 
- research, administration, consulting, and litigation, 
I have been heavily involved in the new era of 
prisoners rights and prison reform which Mr. Inman 
describes in his article and have come to share 
many of the same conclusions which Professor 
Williamson reaches in his. During the past six mon-
ths I have been fortunate enough to be able to con-
centrate on a new but related field, that of the 
juvenile delinquency and child services process. Sur-
W. Anthony Fitch is a graduate of Princeton 
Uni.,ersity and Harvard Law School. He is 
presently an adiunct professor of law at Mar-
shall-Wythe and also serves as Director of the 
Metropolitan Criminal Justice Proiect operating 
in the City of Norfolk. The .,iews expressed 
herein are entirely the author's own and do not 
reflect those of any organization with which he 
is associated. 
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oW. Anthony Fitch 
veying these fields throughout the nation I am 
struck, indeed depressed, with the frequency with 
which I encounter the same inefficiencies, inef-
fectiveness, ambiguities, lack of imagination, 
failures, and abuses which triggered the prisoner 
rights/prison reform revolution. In addition, unlike 
the prisoner rights/prison reform fields, the juvenile 
process, at least in its delinquency adjudication 
aspects, has already been the subject of adverse 
rulings and stringently condemnatory appraisal by 
the United States Supreme Court. 2 litigation in-
volving the hitherto hidden or ignored abuses and 
failures of the juvenile system, especially in its 
. corrections stage, is already beginning to appear 
with increased frequency. 3 Such litigation has a 
sounder foundation than the prisoner rights cases 
because of the rehabilitation and treatment 
obligation imposed by state statutes on state 
juvenile processes,' the closely related develop-
ments in the criminal law field during the 1960's, 
and the sharper delineation and fuller documen-
tation of issues in the juvenile field through scat-
tered litigation during the past ten yearsS and the 
relatively intensive analysis of the area by various 
state and national study commissions. 6 
We in Virginia are fortunate that the Com-
monwealth has avoided some of the problems 
besetting other states' juvenile systems and has 
developed generally concerned, imaginative and 
sophisticated juvenile systems at both the state and 
the local level. It is my impression, however, and I 
speak as a relatively new citizen of the Com-
monwealth, that these developments have occurred 
in spite of, rather than because of, the controlling 
statutory framework. Based on my own review and 
on discussion with numerous local and state per-
sonnel and with law students (often the most per-
ceptive critics of all) I believe that Chapter 16. I of 
the Virginia Code (as well as other provisions which 
I will not address here) is in need of immediate and 
thorough revision if Virginia is to continue to have a 
juvenile delinquency and child services system 
which is progressive and effective and which ac-
curately reflects the will of the people expressed 
through the General Assembly. In its present form 
Chapter 16.1 reflects inconsistent purposes and 
policies, is difficult to use because it lacks any 
systemmatic organization, and provides insufficient 
guidance to the dedicated state and local personnel 
who must enforce its provisions. 
In the remainder of this brief article, I propose to 
review some of the more important provisions in the 
present Code, concentrating perhaps unfairly on 
those sections which I find troubling. Hopefully my 
personal criticisms and recommendations will 
provide a basis (and a target) for further discussion. 
Section 16.1-158 is the core of the chapter. Pur-
suant to this section the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court includes, with certain exceptions, all cases in-
volving children who are allegedly neglected, the 
subject of custody procedings, allegedly involved in 
situations injurious to their welfare, allegedly run-
aways or habitually disobedient or beyond the con-
trol of their parents or incorrigible, allegedly 
habitually truant, allE'gedly in violation of any state 
or federal law or local ordinance, allegedly men-
tally defective or mentally disordered, or allegedly 
the victim of various acts by an adult. The effect of 
this statement of jurisdiction is to make delinquent 
not only acts which would be criminal if committed 
by adults, but also vague and ill-defined statuses 
(endangered welfare, habitually disobedient, 
beyond control, incorrigible) which are not 
necessarily the fault of the child and various minor 
acts (runaway, truancy) which I ond others believe 
can more fairly, more effectively and more 
economically be dealt with by non-judicial agen-
cies.7 At the very least, section 16.1-158 should be 
revised to differentiate between delinquent children, 
neglected children, and children in need of super-
vision8 so that children who have committed no 
criminal act will not be subject to the harsher 
Juvenile Court sanctions. 9 A for more preferable 
revision would remove, perhaps through an orderly 
transition over a period of years, the juvenile-only 
offenses from the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court 
or, alternatively, require a shOWing that non-
adjudicatory, voluntary referrals had not been ef-
ficacious before the Juvenile Court could take 
jurisdiction. '0 On the other hand, those parts of sec-
tion 16.1-158 which to some extent create a family 
court by vesting the Juvenile Court with jurisdiction 
of most offenses aqainst children should be kept. 
The juvenile process is typically commenced upon 
a police officer's taking a child into custody. Sec-
tion 16.1-194 governs this procedure and is a 
model statute. The section sets out the five specific 
instances in which an officer may take custody, thus 
furnishing him with clear, easily followed guidelines 
for his handling of the juvenile." 
Until 1972, upon being referred to the Juvenile 
Court, the child (except in instances of alleged traf-
fic or game and fish law violations) had to be "in-
vestigated".'2 This is the classic intake function'J of 
the Juvenile Court and is considered essential to the 
Juvenile Court concept of non-punitive, 
rehabilitation-oriented processing and treatment of 
allegedly delinquent children. Section 164 no 
longer requires this intake investigation and unlike 
the vast majority of the states and various Model 
Acts, also provides that "nothing herein shall affect 
the right of any person to file a petition if he so 
desires." This provision strips the Juvenile Court 
judge, the prosecutor (if he is involved), and trained 
intake staff of the ability to avert adjudication when 
it is in the best interest of the child andlor the 
public to do so. The section should be amended to 
place the final intake decision with the Com-
monwealth's Attorney," the intake staff or the 
Juvenile Court Juqge. '5 
Once the decision is made to refer a child to the 
Juvenile Court for adjudication of his alleged of-
fense, the Court must decide whether the child 
(Continued page 14) 
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JUVENILE (from page 5) 
should be detained in a detention facility ar retur-
ned to his home pending adjudication and 
disposition of his case. The controlling statutes 
properly provide that this detention hearing shall be 
conducted "as soon ... as is reasonably practicaL." 
(which usually means the next day), that children 
should not be detained in a jailor other facility 
used for adults except in separate rooms or wards, 
and that a child shall be detained only if "there is a 
substantial risk that such child will commit an 
unlawful act or will not appear in court for this 
disposition of his case ... or in the opinion of the 
judge it is necessary for the child's own protec-
tion."16 Unfortunately, children confined in jail are 
sometimes not really separated from adults, since 
all age groups may commingle for meals, exercise, 
recreation, and other required activities or duties; a 
far preferable provision would absolutely prohibit 
the use of jails for the detention of juveniles after 
some date in the not very distant future. Moreover I 
find it difficult to justify the detention of a child on 
the ground that he may commit a future unlawful 
act when such "preventive detention" is arguably 
unconstitutional for adults. 17 Of course, the 
provision that such preventive detention ca n be 
justified only upon the showing of a "substantial 
risk" places a heavy burden of proof upon the State 
to justify such detention and would seem to enable 
a prepared, aggressive attorney to assure his 
client's freedom pending trial in almost every 
cose.1 8 Finally, assuming the amendment of section 
16.1-158 to differentiate between delinquent 
children, children in need of supervision, and 
neglected children, as suggested above, a revised 
detention section should specify the type of deten-
tion faCility in which each category of child may be 
detained. 
'In certain instances a child may be transferred 
from the Juvenile Court for prosecution as an adult. 
I find the statutory provisions governing the transfer 
of a child for criminal prosecution to be among the 
most troubling in the entire Chapter l9 and to raise 
serious constitutional and conceptual problems,20 
The Court, before making its transfer decision, is 
not even required to conduct an investigation of the 
child's "physical, mental and social condition and 
personality;" such an investigation is 
discretionary.21 This social investigation should be 
mandatory in every transfer case, and, contrary to 
the present provision, should normally include a 
psychiatric examination. The Investigation should 
deal only with the needs and characteristics of the 
child. It should not include, as it must under the 
present statute, the "circumstances surrounding the 
violation of the law which IS the cause of his being 
before the court" Such a factual investigation '5 
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contradictory to the rehabilitative purpose of these 
statutes and raises great doubt whether, despite sec-
tion 16.1-140, "the welfa re of the child is the 
paramount concern of the State" in reality. The 
statute prohibits the waiver of any child under 15 
years of age; my admittedly shallow familiarity with 
the adolescent psychology and child services fields 
suggest that this minimum age should be at least 
sixteen. The Juvenile Court may in its discretion 
transfer any child charged with an offense 
punishable by confinement in a penitentiary; this 
discretion should be narrowed to apply to only the 
most serious of crimes. In one of the most serious 
deficiencies of the transfer section, the Juvenile 
Court is stripped of its authority to make the finai 
transfer decision in certain instances; thus the Com-
monwealth's Attorney, without a prior hearing in 
Juvenile Court, is authorized to present to the grand 
jury cases involVing children over fourteen alleged 
to have committed crimes punishable by death or 
confinement in the penitentiary for more than 
twenty years, and cases involving children who are 
alleged to have committed a felony after prior ad-
judication in the Juvenile Court for affenses in-
dicating a viciousness of character (which is 
nowhere defined) or on offense punishable by con-
finement in the penitentiary. This provision raises 
serious constitutiona I issues,23 is totally antithetical 
to the supposed purposes of the juvenile process 
and conce,Pt, and reflects a substantial distrust of 
the ability of the Juvenile Court to render a proper 
transfer decision. Section 16.1-177.1 allows, in ef-
fect, a "transfer without a transfer." Although 
poorly wr n, the provision apparently authorizes 
the Juvenile Court to "deem" certain children over 
thirteen unamenable to juvenile treatment (again, a 
finding not required to be based on a social in-
vestigation). to conduct a trial (as opposed to the 
"'t is hard to understand how in-
carceration of a runaway, a truant or an 
incorrigible child with children who have 
committed much more serious offenses can 
in any way ... be beneficial to him." 
usual juvenile court hearing) and to sentence such 
children, if convicted, as adults. Thus even juvenile 
misdemeonants moy be imprisoned with adults for 
up to 0 year. Mast serious of all, the statute 
provides absolutely no standards or guidelines for 
reaching the various transfer decisions that are 
required. 
I n sum, the present statute makes transfer almost 
automatic in many cases where instead transfer 
should be in the rare exception. I find it impossible 
to believe that the adult criminal process can have 
greater resources for or be more beneficial to the 
child than the juvenile process. Every transfer 
decision is an admission of failure on the State's 
part to render the help and assistance to children 
which it is obligated to provide. Transfering the 
child out of the juvenile process is simply punishing 
him for the failure of the juvenile system, in the past 
and at the time of the transfer decision, to provide 
the assistance and treatment which he needs. 24 
I Section 16.1-173 provides for the appointment of 
counsel in any juvenile case which might result 'in 
the incarceration of the child. The appointed coun-
sel is entitled to reimbursement for his services up to 
the sum of seventy-five dollars for each charge. I 
am uncertain that such a low maximum is fair either 
to the lawyers who serve in the Juvenile Court or to 
the child whose lawyer, under the present 
limitation, may be unable to provide the 
imaginative, comprehensive legal and other services 
frequently required in representing a juvenile. For-
tunately, the Commonwealth of Virginia is com-
mencing in three jurisdictions an experimental 
public defender program. With the proper 
monitoring and evaluation this experiment should 
provide accurate information on the real needs of 
defendants (adult and juvenile) and the cost of 
meeting those needs. The General Assembly will 
then be able to address itself to the documented 
needs. 
Upon finding a child delinquent the Court must 
determine the proper disposition of the child, the 
most difficult decision of all given our limited 
knowledge and resources. 25 Under Section 16.1-
178(4) the Juvenile Court is authorized, among 
other dispositions, to "commit the child or minor 
coming within the provisions of paragraphs (g), (h), 
and (i) of subsection (1) of Section 16.1-158 of this 
law to the care and custody of the State Board of 
Welfare and Institutions." This means, in effect, that 
the child will be incarcerated in one of the Com-
monwealth's "training schools". Under this 
provision the Court may incarcerate not only those 
children who commit an act which if committed by 
on adult would be 0 crime (even though the odult 
perhaps could not be imprisoned for the same act), 
but also children who are runaways, habituolly 
disobedient, beyond control of their parents, in-
corrigible, or truant,26 It is hard to understand how 
incarceration of a runaway, a truant, or an in-
corrigible child with troubled children who have 
committed much mare serious offenses can in any 
way (with the rarest exception) be beneficial to him. 
It is no answer that such children may rarely be in-
co rcerated. 27 like the transfer of children from 
Juvenile Court to a criminal court, incarceration of 
such children and the authority to incarcerate such 
children is simply an admission of the Com-
monwealth's failure or refusal to provide the less 
extreme, more flexible, more economical and more 
effective community-based services which are now 
believed to be most oppropriate for such children. 
As promised above, I have briefly set out those 
parts of Chapter 16.1 which I believe raise the most 
serious questions about the processi ng of juveniles 
in the Commonwealth. I have also briefly stated my 
personal views regarding the most desirable 
revisions of these sections. Needless to say my 
views and the assumptions, values, and policies 
which they reflect have absolutely no more validity 
than those of any other citizen of the Com-
monwealth. However, I do believe that even the 
most objective observer would conclude that the 
Chapter is in need of substantial reorganization 
and revision. A logical next step would be the 
development of one or more well-organized Model 
Statutes with accompanying commentary clearly 
spelling out the purposes, assumptions, costs, and 
benefits of the provisions contained therein. Such 
documents, like, hopefully, the express:vn of my 
personal views in the foregoing, should stimulate 
further informed discussion of the juvenile process. 
It would then be possible for the General Assembly 
to revise Chapter 16.1 in a way that will sub-
stantially reflect the views of the citizenry of the 
15 
Commonwealth and provide clearer guidance and 
greater stimulus for the dedicated judges, attorneys, 
planners and child services personnel which the 
Commonwealth is fortunate in having. § 
ADDENDUM 
Several of the numerous bills affecting the 
juvenile process, which are now pending before the 
General Assembly, deserve comment. Senate Bill 
714 would, in part, allow the post-adjudication 
commitment of children to temporary ("pre-trial") 
juvenile detention facilities, a disposition now 
prohibited by § 16.1-197. Such dispositions would 
result in the indiscriminate mixing, with the con-
comitant peer group pressures and influences, of 
delinquent and non-delinquent, seriously troubled 
and relatively untroubled, children; it would also 
result in still more serious overcrowding of our 
juvenile detention facilities, facilities which are not 
intended, equipped or staffed for the long-term care 
and treatment or adjudicated delinquents. House 
Bill 1446 would allow a court not to conduct social 
investigations before entering disposition orders, a 
further curtailment, like the 1972 "intake" amend-
ments, of the Court's ability to help the children 
who come before it. House Bill 1584 contains 
numerous changes which should not be considered 
until after the "District Court Bill" (HB 14«;7) and 
House Resolution No. 18, calling for a "study and 
report on the laws relating to juveniles and juvenile 
courts," are acted upon by the Assembly. § 
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Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967); President's Com. 
mission on Crime in The District of Columbia, Report 
pp. 636·792 (1966); Russell Sage Foundation, Juvenile 
Delinquency."s Prevention and Control, (1966); 
7. The California General Assembly's Interim Committee 
on Criminal Procedure recently concluded that: 
There is no significant evidence that the 
juvenile court's beyond·control jurisdiction 
has been effective in turning runaways, 
truants, promiscuous girls or other in-
corrigibles into the kind of children whose 
behavior patterns satisfy adult expectation. 
There is even less evidence that Section 601 
has produced happier, healthier children who 
go on to become better adults because of 
their court, probationary or institutional ex· 
perience. Time after time, during its hearings 
on the subject, members of the Committee 
asked witnesses appearing on behalf of Sec· 
tion 601 for proof that any significant num· 
ber of minors had ever benefited from its 
studies, statistics or other evidence that even 
suggest such a conclusion. 
California Assembly, Interim Committe on Criminal 
Procedure, Report on Juvenile Ju.tice Processe., 7, 
(1971 ). 
8. Cf. 16 D. C. Code 2301 (6), (7), (8), and (9). 
9. See, also, text accompanying n. 26, infra. 
10. See Sheridan, Juvenile. Who Commit Noncriminal 
Acts: W"y Treat in a Corredional System?, 31. Fed. 
Prob. 26 (March, 1967) for a balanced discussion of this 
issue. 
11. Contrary to much of the rest of the Chapter, Section 
16.1·194 has the effect of providing the same "arrest" 
procedure for juveniles as for adults, assuming that the 
IIgood cause to believe" provision in subsection 4 is 
eqUivalent to "probable cause". The one exception is 
that subsection 3 authorizes the taking into custody of a 
child whose surroundings mandate "immediote custody 
for the child's welfare"; despite the inherent dangers of 
abuse which always accompany such vague standards, 
this provision is consistent with the neglect jurisdiction 
of the Juvenile Court. 
12. Section 16.1·164 (amended and partially repealed, C.e. 
672. 835, 1972). 
13. Section 16.1·164 does not specifically mention the in· 
take division, providing instead that "the court '''011 
require on investigation . .. " and that lithe court may 
then proceed informally and make such adjustment as is 
practicable ... " (emphasis supplied.) 
14. Cf. 16 D.C. Code 2305. 
15. Cf. Rule 2, Madel Rule. far Juvenile Caurt. (Notional 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Council of Judges, 
1969). 
16. Va. Code 16.1·197 (3), 196, and 199 (a). 
17. Staclc v. 8oyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); but d. 23 D.C. Code 
1322. 
18. However, the high detention rates in some Virginia 
jurisdictions argue against this expectation. Arguably, 
the phrase " ... or in the opinion of the judge [deten. 
tian) is necessary for the child's own protection" 
establishes a lower standard of proof. This vague 
provision may i:1e the basis of many detention decisions. 
Regardless of the basis of detention, in some jurisdic· 
tions a large majority of the children who are detained 
before trial are nat incercerated but instead returned to 
the community after they are adjudicated delinquent. 
Since a child is unlikely to be "rehabilitated" by his stay 
in detention (usually a few weeks, although there is no 
statutory limit), this situation, in many cases, reflects 
either poor pre-trial evaluation and decision-making or 
a subsequent determination that pre-dispositional deten-
tion constitutes sufficient disciplining or punishment. I 
understand the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit 
punishment without the due process of law accorded by 
the juvenile hearing. 
19. §§ 16.1-176, 16.1-176.1, 16.1-177.1. 
20. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), 
on remand, 401 F. 2d. 408 (D.C. Cir.1968); Haziel v. 
United States, 404 F. 2d. 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Com-
ment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable 
Validity of Existing Statutory Standards. 16 St. Louis U. 
L. R. 604 (1972). 
21. In Tilton v. Commonwealth. 196 Va. 774, 85 S. E. 1 d 
368 (1955), the Virginia Supreme Court held that Va. 
Code § 16-172.42, which provided that " ... the Court 
shall require a full and complete investigation ... " made 
o pre-transfer investigation mandatory in every case. 
Section 16.1-176, the successor of Section 16-172.42 
was amended by Chapter 314 of the Acts of Assembly 
of 1960 to read that "the court may . .. require an in-
vestigation ... " In James v_ Cox, 323 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. 
Va., Richmond Division, 1971), the Court, relying on 
Tilton v. Commonwealth, supra, stated that pre-transfer 
investigations are mandatory, but no case decided since 
the 1960 amendment, including those cited by the Court 
in James v. Cox in support of its statement, so holds. 
Similarly, the Court in Redmon v. Peyton, 420 F. 2d 
822, 825 (4th Cir. 1969), assumed that a pre-transfer in-
vestigation is mandatory but rests this assumption only 
upon Tilton v. Commonwealth, supra. 
22. The General Assembly must certainly have meant 
"alleged violation." 
23. See Cox v. U. S., F. 2d (4th Cir. Sep-
tember 12, 1972), 12 Cr. L. Rptr. 2002; but d. U. S. v. 
Blond, F.2d (No. 71-1761, D.C. Cir, 
September 6, 1972), 11 Cr. L. Rptr. 2516. 
24. Schorn horst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: 
Kent Revisited. 43 Ind. L. J. 583, 602 (1968); 80zelon, 
Racism, Classism and the Juvenile Process, 53 
Judicature 374, 376-378; National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, AdVisory Council of Judges, Transfer 
of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A 
Policy Statement, 8 Crime and Delinquency, 3-7 (1962). 
25. Cf. United States v. Waters, 437 F. 2d 722, 723 (D. C. 
Cir 1970), a case involving the sentencing of a youth of-
fender under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 28 
U.S.c. 5001 et seq, 
What happens to an offender alter conviction is the 
least understood, the mast fraught with irrational 
discrepancies and the mast in need of improvement of 
any phose in our criminal justice system 
26. See text accompanying n. 7-9, supra, 
In Winship v, United States, supra, the Supreme Court 
held that children alleged to have committed a criminal 
offense must be proven delinquent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The effect of Sections 16.1-158 (1) (g) (h) and (i) 
and 16.1-178 (4), in light of Winship, is to permit the in-
cercerotion in the State's training schools of child·ren 
who have not committed any criminal offense on a 
lower standard of proof that is required for children 
who have violated the criminal laws. 
27 Statistics which I have seen Indicate that quite the con-
trary is 'rue. 
INSURANCE 
the following results: 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
a substantial increase in the number of 
problems token to lawyers-double the 
pre-plan usage; 
a reduction of the client's initial ap-
prehension about going to a lawyer; 
on increase in the use of lawyers in the 
counselling or preventive role; 
a reduction in the overage cost per case 
from a pre-plan $187 to $165. 
Left unanswered at present is the pivotal question 
of whether the prepaid legal services concept is 
feasible for wide scale implementation, Other 
questions, such as what is the overage person's per-
ception of the lawyer's role, how one decides that 
he has a "legal" problem, and to what extent in-
creased availability of legal services on acceptable 
economic terms will change these attitudes, are 
crucial to the future of prepaid services plans. 
Hopefully the comprehensive report by the ABA 
Special Committee on the Shreveport Plan's first 
two years of operation, expected to be available 
very soon, will furnish insights into these and other 
questions. 
Activity, both private and bar-sponsored, in the 
field of prepaid legal services is widespread and 
growing. As of March, 1972, twenty-six state bar 
associations hod formed committees charged with 
the duty of exploration a ndlor planning in the field. 
Two state bar associations-California and New Jer-
sey-hod nearly reached the point ot implementation; 
and the ABA hod underwritten, in addition to the 
Shreveport Plan, two other pilot projects in Califor-
nia, In the private sector, there are already a dozen 
open panel plans proposed or in operation, spon-
sored by unions, consumer groups, commercial in-
surance carriers, and other non-legal private firms. 
The role of the ABA and the rest of the organized 
bar in this developmental activity is a critical one. 
As succinctly expressed by David K. Robinson, Past-
President of the California State Bar Association: 
The organized bar must assume early leader-
ship in this field, Otherwise it may well come 
under the control of people outside the 
profession who are governed by different 
professional and ethical standards. 
In its February, 1972, report, the ABA's Special 
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services identified 
numerous privately sponsored prepaid plans, ob-
serving that "some of them appear to be entirely 
conceived and operated by non-lawyers with a view 
toward creating a vehicle for providing legal ser-
vices at a profit". noting further that "lack of 
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the metamorphosis of 
the nation's oldest law school 
George Campbell 
Several years ago, an administrative decision 
was made to increase the size of the faculty and the 
student body of Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
During a period of growth and development over 
the past three years, the number of law students has 
doubled, the faculty has increased significantly, 
pla~~ have been finalized for an additional physical 
facility, the number of applications have tripled, 
new academic policy and curriculum have been im-
plemented, and student participation in extra-
curricular activities has exploded. 
ENROLLMENT DOUBLES IN THREE YEARS 
In 1958, Marshall-Wythe had a total enrollment 
of 60 part-time and full-time students. The school 
began to grow at that time as the size of each in-
coming class increased from 20, to 35, to 50, and 
then to 75 where it remained relatively static until 
September of 1970. As requests for admission grew 
and in an attempt to provide a more extensive legal 
education for a greater number of students, a 
decision was made that the size of the law school 
would be increased from what was considered to be 
a small law school to one of medium size. It was 
believed that growth would be most easily 
facilitated by doubling the number enrolled in each 
class over a three year period. 
In September of 1970, the entering class-the 
present third-year class-was 182 strong, quite a 
jump from the 75 of previous years. However, the 
former figure reflects a greater number of ac-
ceptances by entering students than had been an-
ticipated when the offers to matriculate were ex-
tended. In 1971 the present second-year class was 
admitted with 177 students, CI class size whi.ch was 
again too large as a result of the attempt to an-
ticipate the number which would accept the in-
vitation for admittance. The phase of growth was 
completed this year as the present first-year class 
was enrolled at 150, the figure which had been 
sought in the previous two years and which will 
stand as the archetype for the future. At present, the 
faculty numbers 25, producing a student-faculty 
ratio of 20 to 1. 
Havi ng atta i ned the level of th is yea r' s student 
enrollment of 450, the law school is believed to be 
at the optimum size to retain some of the benefits of 
a "small-school" environment, yet afford students 
the more extensive opportunities available in a 
larger law school. As Dean James P. Whyte states, 
"The growth factor is not important for its own sake 
- it's calculated to provide an atmosphere and a 
series of opportunities to enable students to get the 
best legal education we can give them. Growth 
would not be desirable if it injured that objective". 
GROWING PAINS 
Marshall-Wythe's expansion has created some 
problems, among the most note-worthy of which is 
the grave strain upon the present physical facility. 
The institution of extensive legal writing 
requirements into the curriculum, the increase in 
Moot Court participation, a growing number of in-
dependent research projects, and a larger Law 
Review staff has caused overcrowding in the law 
library which can be described only as chaotic. 
library materials and personnel have had to be 
assigned to other locations outside the law school 
building. In order to accommodate the increase in 
the size of classes, many class sessions are held in 
Rogers Hall, a building adjacent to the law school. 
Out of necessity, a number of administrative, 
faculty, and student activities offices have been 
moved to a college administrative building, James 
Blair Hall. These illustrations of present inadequate 
conditions and general administrative and student 
discomfort serve as manifestations of the crucial 
need for an additional law school structure. 
Hopefully, the needed additional space for Mar-
shall-Wythe will be attained by a complete 
renovation of Rogers Hall, the adjacent building 
which currently houses the chemistry department. 
Plans call for a remodeling of the three story struc-
ture to include classrooms; faculty, administrative, 
and student organization offices; a student lounge 
area; a student dining area; several lecture halls; 
and facu Ity a nd student conference a reas. The 
present law school building will most probably be 
restyled to provide the much needed ac-
commodations for the growing law library. 
Unfortunately, the actual commencement of the 
renovation of Rogers Hall still remains several years 
away since that buil~ing will not be vacated until 
after the new college chemistry building is con-
structed. The work on the new chemistry structure 
probably will start in the spring of 1973 with a 
projectecj completion in the next one and a half to 
two and a half years. Thereafter, the Rogers Hall 
project should begi n. 
NUMBER OF APPLICANTS SOARS 
As Marshall-Wythe has grown in size, the num-
ber of applicants requesting admission has tripled. 
In 1970,770 applications were received for a class 
which was enrolled at 182; in 1971, 1,292, ap-
plications were processed for a class of 177; and in 
LAW 
1972, 2,244 requests for admission were received 
for a class enrolled at 150. 
As a result of the increased demand to gain ad-
mittance to the law school, there has been a steady 
rise in the objective qualifications of Marshall-
Wythe students: the median Law School Aptitude 
Test score for the present first-year class is 616 with 
a median grade-point average of 3.0 on a 4.0 
scale. 
For the most part, objective factors are the prin-
cipal determinants of whether an applicant will be 
offered admission to the law school. Associate 
Dean Richard A. Williamson, in charge of Ad-
missions and Placement, affirms that grades and the 
LS.A.T. are still the principle basis of determining 
qualifications for admission, although he has com-
mented, "We're making on effort to place less em-
phasis on purely objective qualifications; we can 
become more selective in terms of subjective 
qualifications because of the quantity of ap-
plications as once a certain paint in the l.S.A.T. and 
the grade-point average is reached, the objective 
distinctions begin to disappear." 
(Continued page J 3) 
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Dean Williamson has also observed, "The school 
has been fortunate in the past in terms of the quality 
of the applicants because a better qualified ap-
plicant can only serve to benefit the public in a 
profession which demands skill, trust, and in-
tell igence." 
PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY 
With the increase in the number of students, the 
Placement Program at Marshall-Wythe has sought a 
wider basis of contact with prospective employers. 
The mailing done by the student Placement Director 
has tripled in the past three years. This year, more 
than 1,000 firms in 30 states were contacted, a fact 
which reflects the desires of students to seek more 
diverse types of employment in various 
geographical areas. 
Another product of Marshall-Wythe's growth has 
been the expansion of the curriculum by offering a 
more varied opportunity for legal study in response 
to the divergent interests of students. At present, the 
on Iy requi red cou rses after the fi rst yea rare two 
hours of Constitutional law and three hours of 
Criminal law. More stringent legal writing 
requirements have been instituted, and a greater 
variety of courses and seminars are being offered, 
several examples of which are Consumer Credit, 
Environmental law, land Finance, Regulated In-
dustries, a Juvenile law Seminar, and a Products 
liability Seminar. Professor Thomas A. Collins, 
Chairman of the Faculty Curriculum Committee, 
feels that the goal af the present course offerings is 
"to provide exposure for students in all areas, and 
the opportunity to develop specific expertise in par-
ticular areas." 
New general academic regulations are in the 
process of being classified and developed, among 
which is the policy that a student will not be drop-
ped for grade deficiency in the middle of an 
academic year. 
EXTRACURRICULARS CHANNELIZE STUDENT 
ENERGIES 
Increased student enrollment has been a 
significant causative factor in the growth of new 
student organizations. Marshall-Wythe offers a 
student the opportunity of participation in recently 
formed organizations such as the Environmental 
law Group, the legislative Research Council, the In-
ternational law Society, the Post-Conviction 
Assistance Project, and the Women law Students 
Association. A greater number of students are in-
volved in law Review, Moot Court, and the legal 
Aid Program. The law school newspaper, The 
Amicus Curiae, has expanded to a newsprint for-
mat, and the Colonial Lawyer has emerged as a 
vehicle for more effective intra-student and student-
alumni communication. The Virginia Bar Notes 
continues to meet the needs of Virginia law students 
preparing to take the bar exam. The Student Bar 
Association has grown in size, sponsoring a greater 
number of student organizations and social and 
professional events; and the law fraternities are 
likewise expanding in size and service. 
The increased interest in and support for extra-
curricular activities may be explained by a growing 
interest on the part of students to broaden the scope 
of their education beyond the confines of the purely 
academic and even make some contribution to the 
profession while working toward a degree. As Dean 
Whyte states, "Students are increasingly interested 
in and conscious of what is happening in the area 
of legal education; they seem to be more interested 
in creating an educational experience which they 
deem practical, such as participation in clinical 
programs." 
CONCLUSIONS 
In an overall assessment of the growth of Mar-
shall-Wythe, Dean Whyte summarizes, "The law 
school has made very significant steps toward 
reaching the type of curriculum we want, and I 
believe we have been very fortunate in attracting 
faculty members who're doing a good job in their 
special interests." 
As Marshall-Wythe continues - in its process of 
development, the role of alumni becomes in-
creasingly prominent and crucial. The alumni are 
currently planning a fund-raising campaign to be 
instituted on a yearly basis, the proceeds from 
which will contribute to the general support of the 
law school. Dean Whyte foresees the support of the 
ever-growing number of Marshall-Wythe graduates 
as providing a solid foundation for the future 
growth and improvement of the school: "Our 
alumni are increaSingly interested in the well-being 
of this law school; their enthusiasm is ever on the 
rise. Talented and devoted alumni are working to 
assure the continued development of Marshall-
Wythe." 
I n the foreseeable future, the present size of Mar-
shall-Wythe should remain relatively constant. 
Although innovative activities and meaningful op-
portunities should continue to develop, the major 
emphasis will be the refinement of the policies and 
programs of a noteworthy educational institution 
which professes and meets the objective of offering 
the community, the state, and the notion a high 
quality professional. § 
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During the post few years a growing concern 
has developed among lawyers and bar associations 
with the problem of providing legal services to the 
seventy per cent of the American population that is 
neither rich nor poor at a cost that is less than 
prohibitive. The problem is a m·ulti-faceted one, 
having its genesis in the seemingly high cost of such 
services, but involving, as well, the life-style of mem-
bers of this group, in which the concept of "preven-
tive low" is unrecognized and legal costs of any 
nature are acceptable only when inescapable. 
Numerous methods have been considered over 
decision in United Transportation Union v. State 
Bar of Michigan, 401 U. S. 596 (1971), holding 
that such group arrangements are protected under 
the First Amendment, the proliferation of such plans, 
now numbering from two to three thousand, can be 
expected to continue. These group legal plans are 
generally of the "closed panel" variety, which 
restricts the member's choice of attorney to one of 
those pre-selected by the group. Coverage is usually 
limited to such work-related problems as workmen's 
compensation, unemployment compensation, and 
the like. There has been a tendency, however, since 
"Legal Aid" for 
the Silent Majority 
the years, the aim of which, in port at least, has 
been to neutralize the justificable fear of high legal 
costs among the consuming public. Included among 
the suggested methods are a modification of the in-
come tax structure to allow a deduction for the cost 
of personal legal services, the charging of at-
torney's fees to the losing party, and programs to 
finance the costs of legal services through lending 
institutions. Such proposals, however, tend to imply 
that fear of cost is the sole deterrent to seeking 
legal services. Furthermore they emphasize the 
litigatory role of the lawyer, to the exclusion of his 
role as a counselor; and while recognizing the need 
for legal services, these measures would do little to 
generate the demand necessary before they can be 
effectively del ivered to potentia I consu m mers. 
This article will examine the concept of prepaid 
legal services as a possible solution to this problem. 
Exploration. of Jhis concept necessitates looking 
briefly at what the concept entails, presenting ac-
tivity in the field with possibilities of future develop-
ment and considering whether the ideo represents a 
viable means of delivering legal services in on 
economically feasible manner to the 140 million 
Americans of moderate means. . 
The concept of group legal services is not a new 
one, and the number of organizations offering these 
services to their members has increased rapidly 
since World War II. With the Supreme Court's 
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United Transportation Union to increase the scope 
of coverage under some of these plans to include a 
limited number of personal, non-work-related 
problems. 
Prepaid legal service plans differ from traditional 
group legal plans in two essential respects. 
Coverage under the prepaid legal plans extends to 
any legal problem of a member, with certain ex-
ceptions; and the member is free to choose his own 
lawyer from all lawyers enrolled in the plan, all 
members of either the local or state bars, or any 
lawyer anywhere, depending on the plan. 
The essential characteristic of a prepaid legal 
services plan is its function as a system for the 
delivery of legal services to large numbers of per-
sons, ordinarily associated in common-interest 
groups in which the costs of the services are 
prepaid by either the member or sc;>meone else on 
his behalf. To ovoid the "adverse selection" effects 
on actuarial projections which would result from 
enrollment in the plan by only those members of the 
group are normally enrolled, thus spreading the risk 
among a large number of persons. Plans allowing 
members to join at their option would tend to defeat 
this objective. 
at their option would tend to deteat this objective. 
The benefits offered by the plan can be designed 
in terms of either a specified number of hours of a 
lawyer's time which may be devoted to Qny type of 
legal work needed or, similar to medical insurance 
plans, a schedule of maxium amounts allowed for 
specified legal services. Several methods of paying 
for the plan have been proposed: direct payment by 
the member (in which case the cost of collecting 
payments would be prohibitively high in most in-
stances), payment of a lump sum by a third party 
(e.g. a union) to the organization furnishing the 
benefits, or a payroll deduction made by the em-
ployer and remitted to the organization. 
Under one type of prepaid services plan, 
represented by the one now in operation in Los 
~ 
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$40 in court costs, 
$150 in out of pocket expenses ($25 
prepayment by the client if he is the 
moving party); 
(4) where member is defendant or respan-
dent, receipt of the benefits under (3) plus 
80% of the next $1,000 incurred as ex-
penses of litigation. 
Excluded from coverage under. the plan are: 
...... 
o " 
Cj.'-;;{). 
(1) legal fees and expenses incurred by the 
member in connection with any business 
venture; 
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Angeles County, the member is restricted in his 
choice of lawyer to one who has registered to work 
with the plan, agreeing to abide by its rules and ad-
ministrative procedures. In contrast, under the 
prepaid plan currently operating in Shreveport, 
Louisiana, the member can receive services from 
any of the 225 members of the local bor engaged 
in private practice. 
The Shreveport Plan, a pilot project initiated by 
the ABA in January of 1971 to run for two years, is 
illustrative of what could be developed on a larger 
scale under the prepaid concept. Under this plan, 
members of the Shreveport Bar Association have 
been furnishing legal services to the approximately 
600 members of Local 229 of the International 
Laborers Union. The operation is financed by a con-
tribution from the union of two cents per union 
member per working hour, with the ABA un-
derwriting any deficiencies up to $25,000. Benefits 
available to the union member under the plan in-
clude: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
$100 for consultative services, not to ex-
ceed $25 per visit; 
$250 for office work (i. e., investigation, 
research, negotiation); 
representation in a judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding with maximum 
allowances of; 
$325 for legal fees, 
I 
(2) controversies involving immediate parties 
to the ;::>Ian; 
(3) cases customarily handled by contingent 
fee; 
(4) filling out income tax returns; 
(5) any case in which legal representation 
will be provided the member through any 
insurance policy; 
(6) "opinion shopping". 
During the plan's first 16 months of operation, 
there were 132 certifications of eligibility mode un-
der it, 72 cases were closed, with 61 billed to the 
plan which paid 94% of all claims made. Twenty-
seven percent of the covered group were using the 
plan, as of May, 1972, as opposed to a 20% use 
rate for its first year of operation. Classified by sub-
ject matter, the cases billed to the plan broke down 
as follows: 
Domestic matters 19% 
Auto 10% 
Real property 15% 
Retail Credit 
and Consumer 8% 
Criminal 7% 
While indicating that its analysis of the data was 
for from complete, the ABA's Special Committee on 
Prepaid Legal Services reported that the plan had 
(Continued page J 7) 
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Since a child is unlikely to be "rehabilitated" by his stay 
in detention (usually a few weeks, although there is no 
statutory limit), this situation, in many cases, reflects 
either poor pre-trial evaluation and decision-making or 
a subsequent determination that pre-dispositional deten-
tion constitutes sufficient disciplining or punishment. I 
understand the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit 
punishment without the due process of law accorded by 
the juvenile hearing. 
19. §§ 16.1-176, 16.1-176.1, 16.1-177.1. 
20. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), 
on remand, 401 F. 2d. 408 (D.C. Cir.1968); Haziel v. 
United States, 404 F. 2d. 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Com-
ment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable 
Validity of Existing Statutory Standards. 16 St. Louis U. 
L. R. 604 (1972). 
21. In Tilton v. Commonwealth. 196 Va. 774, 85 S. E. 1 d 
368 (1955), the Virginia Supreme Court held that Va. 
Code § 16-172.42, which provided that " ... the Court 
shall require a full and complete investigation ... " made 
o pre-transfer investigation mandatory in every case. 
Section 16.1-176, the successor of Section 16-172.42 
was amended by Chapter 314 of the Acts of Assembly 
of 1960 to read that "the court may . .. require an in-
vestigation ... " In James v_ Cox, 323 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. 
Va., Richmond Division, 1971), the Court, relying on 
Tilton v. Commonwealth, supra, stated that pre-transfer 
investigations are mandatory, but no case decided since 
the 1960 amendment, including those cited by the Court 
in James v. Cox in support of its statement, so holds. 
Similarly, the Court in Redmon v. Peyton, 420 F. 2d 
822, 825 (4th Cir. 1969), assumed that a pre-transfer in-
vestigation is mandatory but rests this assumption only 
upon Tilton v. Commonwealth, supra. 
22. The General Assembly must certainly have meant 
"alleged violation." 
23. See Cox v. U. S., F. 2d (4th Cir. Sep-
tember 12, 1972), 12 Cr. L. Rptr. 2002; but d. U. S. v. 
Blond, F.2d (No. 71-1761, D.C. Cir, 
September 6, 1972), 11 Cr. L. Rptr. 2516. 
24. Schorn horst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: 
Kent Revisited. 43 Ind. L. J. 583, 602 (1968); 80zelon, 
Racism, Classism and the Juvenile Process, 53 
Judicature 374, 376-378; National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency, AdVisory Council of Judges, Transfer 
of Cases Between Juvenile and Criminal Courts: A 
Policy Statement, 8 Crime and Delinquency, 3-7 (1962). 
25. Cf. United States v. Waters, 437 F. 2d 722, 723 (D. C. 
Cir 1970), a case involving the sentencing of a youth of-
fender under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 28 
U.S.c. 5001 et seq, 
What happens to an offender alter conviction is the 
least understood, the mast fraught with irrational 
discrepancies and the mast in need of improvement of 
any phose in our criminal justice system 
26. See text accompanying n. 7-9, supra, 
In Winship v, United States, supra, the Supreme Court 
held that children alleged to have committed a criminal 
offense must be proven delinquent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The effect of Sections 16.1-158 (1) (g) (h) and (i) 
and 16.1-178 (4), in light of Winship, is to permit the in-
cercerotion in the State's training schools of child·ren 
who have not committed any criminal offense on a 
lower standard of proof that is required for children 
who have violated the criminal laws. 
27 Statistics which I have seen Indicate that quite the con-
trary is 'rue. 
INSURANCE 
the following results: 
(I) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
a substantial increase in the number of 
problems token to lawyers-double the 
pre-plan usage; 
a reduction of the client's initial ap-
prehension about going to a lawyer; 
on increase in the use of lawyers in the 
counselling or preventive role; 
a reduction in the overage cost per case 
from a pre-plan $187 to $165. 
Left unanswered at present is the pivotal question 
of whether the prepaid legal services concept is 
feasible for wide scale implementation, Other 
questions, such as what is the overage person's per-
ception of the lawyer's role, how one decides that 
he has a "legal" problem, and to what extent in-
creased availability of legal services on acceptable 
economic terms will change these attitudes, are 
crucial to the future of prepaid services plans. 
Hopefully the comprehensive report by the ABA 
Special Committee on the Shreveport Plan's first 
two years of operation, expected to be available 
very soon, will furnish insights into these and other 
questions. 
Activity, both private and bar-sponsored, in the 
field of prepaid legal services is widespread and 
growing. As of March, 1972, twenty-six state bar 
associations hod formed committees charged with 
the duty of exploration a ndlor planning in the field. 
Two state bar associations-California and New Jer-
sey-hod nearly reached the point ot implementation; 
and the ABA hod underwritten, in addition to the 
Shreveport Plan, two other pilot projects in Califor-
nia, In the private sector, there are already a dozen 
open panel plans proposed or in operation, spon-
sored by unions, consumer groups, commercial in-
surance carriers, and other non-legal private firms. 
The role of the ABA and the rest of the organized 
bar in this developmental activity is a critical one. 
As succinctly expressed by David K. Robinson, Past-
President of the California State Bar Association: 
The organized bar must assume early leader-
ship in this field, Otherwise it may well come 
under the control of people outside the 
profession who are governed by different 
professional and ethical standards. 
In its February, 1972, report, the ABA's Special 
Committee on Prepaid Legal Services identified 
numerous privately sponsored prepaid plans, ob-
serving that "some of them appear to be entirely 
conceived and operated by non-lawyers with a view 
toward creating a vehicle for providing legal ser-
vices at a profit". noting further that "lack of 
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"It would be error to regard to the ABA's 
efforts in the study and development of 
prepaid legal services as ... unsullied by 
any self interest." 
specific statutory authority and regulation ... creates 
something of a vacuum". 
The question of by whom, and to what extent the 
developing plans will be regulated is vital to the 
legal profession. To the extent that lawyers are in-
volved, regulation is possible through professional 
channels. Where viewed as insurance or established 
as a fringe benefit, the plans could be regulated in 
the manner customary in those fields. One thing, 
however, is predictable--if such pIa ns proliferate 
free of effective control and, in the end, short-
change their members, the bar, and not the ad-
ministrators of such plans, will bear the brunt of the 
resulting public frustration and disfavor. 
The ABA has been approached by private in-
surance carriers,seeking its guidance in the develop-
ment of a plan or its imprimatur on one already 
developed. The position taken by the Association 
has been that it would not be feasible for it to 
propose a single plan or set of plans, but rather 
that plans best suited for local needs should be 
developed by state and local bar associations. The 
Special Committee on Prepaid legal Services, while 
refusing to endorse any plan or advance any 
prototype, has promulgated, however, the following 
guidelines as to what such a plan should include at 
a minimum: 
(I) full disclosure of the nature and scope of 
the pIa nand the extent of the pIa n' s u n-
dertaking (i.e., to what extent is the 
obligation to provide legal services con-
ditioned upon the funds held by the 
organization administering the plan) 
(2) protection of the integrity of the lawyer-
client relationship; 
(3) participation by all concerned parties in 
the plan's formulation, adoption, and 
evaluation. 
Implicit in all the ABA's work in this area is the 
goal that open panel, or free choice of lawyer, 
plans remain available to those who prefer them. 
18 
Before prepaid legal service plans can play any 
significant role in the delivery of legal services to 
middle-income Americans, and especially to the 
twenty million union members that comprise the 
largest single potential market for them, there must 
be some resolution of several existing problems and 
questions under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
Initially it must be decided, in order that legal 
services take their place as a negotiated fringe 
benefit, whether they are mandatory or a permissive 
bargaining subject under the Taft-Hartley Act (29 
U.S.C. 185, § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d). More importantly, 
as now written, §302(c) of the Taft Hartley Act does 
not include legal services as a fringe benefit which 
can be paid for by deductions from the employee's 
pay, such deductions to go to a jointly-trusteed fund 
from which the cost of the legal services program 
can be paid. This is the most widely-used method 
for paying for health and welfare benefit programs; 
and its continued unavailability for legal services 
programs would tend to increase their cost and 
lessen their potential for wide spread im-
plementation, at least among union members. 
Another question arises as to the tax-exempt 
status of the legal services trust funds that would be 
created under these plans if the organization 
qualifies as a non-profit corporation. Section 501 
(c) (9) of the I nternal Revenue Code, exempts from 
taxation voluntary employee beneficiary 
associations which provide for "the payment of life, 
sick, accident, or other benefits to the members .... " 
The question of whether legal services would qualify 
under the "other benefits" provision would have to 
be resolved. 
The future of prepaid legal servk~_ will also be 
influenced by the institution of a national health in-
surance plan. This would undoubtedly free for other 
purposes a large part of the two billion dollars 
spent annually on private health plans. Moreover, 
such a development would no doubt sharpen the in-
terest of private insurance carriers in the develop-
ment of legal insurance plans. 
In the final analysis, however, the future of 
prepaid legal services depends upon some answers 
which are simply not yet available. Will lowenny or 
prepaying the cost of legal services entirely change 
the nature and quantity of problems the average 
person is willing to bring to a lawyer? Does the 
average person consider the free choice of lawyer 
to be an important factor? Would he be as 
satisfied, perhaps even more secure, in going to a 
lawyer who had been preselected for him by the 
leaders of an organization fo which he belongs? 
And, finally, although there is a demonstrable need 
for legal services, can there be developed a 
corresponding demand? 
Of one thing, however, there can be no doubt. A 
profession which cannat or will not make its ser-
vices available to the majority of the people on a 
basis which they will view as being economically 
acceptable must face the probability that, in the 
end, changes will be made in the economic and 
professional barriers that appear to block the af-
fordable supply of these services. It would be error 
to regard the ABA's efforts in the study and develop-
ment of prepaid legal services programs as an exer-
cise in pure professional responsibility, unsullied by 
any self-interest. Clearly, any large scale im-
plementation of such programs would be a boon to 
the legal profession. Having said this, however, it is 
nevertheless submitted that such programs should 
be developed, and that they should be developed by 
the organized bar, whose members are governed by 
enforceable ethical restrictions by which insurance 
companies and other private parties are not, un-
fortunately, bound. Prepaid legal services 
programs, aside from the undeniably valuable 
prospect they offer members of the bar, possess a 
real potential for improving the quality of American 
justice, by assuring to a greater number of people 
effective legal redress of grievances, unac-
companied by extreme and unacceptable financial 
hardship. § 
ORDER OF COIF DENIED 
Last year Dean Whyte submitted an application 
to the Order of the Coif in order to have a chapter 
established at William and Mary. Representatives of 
the Order came last Spring to visit and evaluate the 
law school. On January 5, 1973, Dean Whyte 
posted the following results: "Our petition to install 
a chapter of Order of the Coif has been denied. 
While our rating was high of faculty and students, it 
was the conclusion of the Executive Committee of 
the Order that resource allocation to the Law 
School was below desired standards. This is a 
situation of which we are all aware and which is 
constantly being improved. We have been invited to 
reapply when resource allocations have been suf-
ficiently altered." § 
CLASS OF 1945 
LYON G. TYLER, JR. became an Associate 
Professor of History at The Citadel this academic 
year. His new address is Box 474, Charleston, 
South Carolina 29402. 
CLASS OF 1949 
Listed in Who's Who in Government and Who's 
Who in Rai/roading is ROBERT R. BOYD. Mr. Boyd 
is presently serving the National Transportation 
Safety Board as an Administrative Law Judge. 
DIXON L. FOSTER, judge of the Twelfth Judicial 
Circuit, Lancaster, Virginia, attended the National 
College of the State Judiciary at" the University of 
Nevada in Reno this past summer. The school was 
begun several years ago for trial judges allover the 
United States and provides a four week course 
dealing with such matters as criminal evidence, jury 
trials, sentencing and probation, and the like. 
RONALD KING took the time to send this piece 
of advice to present Marshall-Wythe students: 
"Don't think of the Rule of Perpetuities as a museum 
piece. It's alive and well and may be significant in 
your practice some day." 
ANDERSON B. SMITH, JR., of the firm of Car-
neal, Smith and Athey in Williamsburg, has recently 
been appointed U.S. Magistrate (part time) for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Newport News Division. 
CLASS OF 1952 
ROBERT F. BOYD has been elected to the 
National Association of College and University At-
torneys. 
Serving as Judge of the Virginia Beach Traffic 
Court is HENRY L. LAM. Judge Lam is credited with 
establishing one of the first, if not the first, traffic 
schools in the nation for motorcyclists. 
CLASS OF 1958 
As of February J, ROBERT C. VAUGHAN's ad-
dress will be 36 Paxton Road, West Hartford, Con-
necticut. Mr. Vaughan is Vice-President and Direc-
tor of the Pension Department, Underwriters' Ser-
vice Agency, Inc. The Vaughan'S had their fifth child 
and second daughter, Lorilee Ann, in 1971. 
CLASS OF 1963 
Elected to the Republican State Central Com-
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As a class lawyers are often cited as being 
both dilatory and uneconomical creatures. Perhaps 
the most uneconomic utilization of the typical at-
torney's time is the hours he spends on most real 
estate transactions, primarily as a consequence of 
the ti me-consu m i ng title sea rc h. For ma ny yea rs, but 
significantly only in the past few years, forward-
thinking attorneys have been successfully ex-
perimenting with the use of lay persons in their real 
estate practices. While the economic benefit is ob-
vious, it has always been optional, dependent only 
on the individual attorney's desire for efficiency. 
Recently, however, the option has been threatened 
and economy measures appea~ to be mandatory. 
Both the role of the lawyer in Virginia land tran-
sactions and settlement costs to the buyer of 
residential real estate are presently under attack 
from two sides. An attorney was successful in a 
recent suit in the U.S. District Court in Alexandria 
against the Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax, and 
Virginia Bar Associations, alleging illegal restraint 
of trade because of their unified minimum fee 
schedule of settlement and closing costs. On the 
other side, the Sec reta ry of the Depa rtment of 
Housing and Urban Development, and the Ad-
ministrator of the Veterans Administration, 
authorized by §701 of the Emergency Home 
Finance Act of 1970 to establish standards for set-
tlement costs in HUD and VA insured transactions, 
have proposed reg·ulations applicable to six areas 
of the United States, one of which is the 
Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Area. The 
regulations would cut the fees of attorneys in Nor-
thern Virginia 65% to 75%, and the indication from 
HUD is that the remainder of Virginia will soon be 
subject to regulation. I The regulations, if adopted, 
could economically foreclose the attorney from 
practice in residentia I rea I estate tra nsactions. 
Thus, there is a need for the ·attorney to reduce 
his costs of services· he provides for a buyer. As 
mentioned above, one way of reducing these costs 
may be to incorporate the use of laymen in the 
process-either paraprofessionals, such as those lay 
persons or agencies such as title insurance com-
panies or realtors, entitled by law to perform ser-
vices incident to a land sale creating rights and 
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obligations between the buyer and seller, or para-
legal aides, such as secretaries or lay persons 
working for a lawyer who perform services incident 
to a land transaction, which services do not of 
themselves create legal rights and obligations bet-
ween buyer and seller. 
The use of a real estate broker's services is a 
second alternative for cost reduction. Initially in the 
transaction the real estate agent may list a house as 
bei ng for so Ie a nd try to fi nd a buyer, under the 
authority given by the person wishing 10 sell the 
house. After he finds 0 buyer, the realtor may 
prepare a contract of sale for the property. The con-
tract, creating preliminary rights and obligations 
between the parties, is virtually as for as the realtor 
can go in the land transfer process. The general 
rule is that the drafting of deeds, mortgages, and 
instruments constituting the legal means by which 
the transfer occurs, is the practice of low, and 
laymen cannot perform these services. In some 
states simple drafting incidental to loy work is per-
mitted, but only where it does not involve legal 
iudqment on the port of the realtor.2 
In a Virginia case, where a real estate broker 
habitually prepared deeds. deeds of trust, mort-
gages, and deeds of release in connection with the 
sale of reo I estate, charging a $5.00 minimum fee 
per document, the Court held that preparation of 
such documents constituted the illegal practice of 
low. Commonwealth y. Jonel and Robins. 186 Va: 
30 (1947). Under this decision there are no services 
incident to the land transfer that laymen in the real 
estate business can provide which would cut costs. 
While on argument could be mode that it tokes no 
legal judgment to fill in a form deed, the realtor 
would be rendering a disservice 10 the buyer unless 
he could advise his client of the marketability of 
title and the legal effects of defects of title, a ser-
vice which, considering the land recordation system 
in Virginia, only a lawyer is capable of per-
forming.' 
Unlike realtors, title insurance companies in 
Virginia, as loy agencies, are authorized to provide 
more services creating legal rights and duties on 
buyer and seller. Under Va. Code f 38.1.728, title 
companies may search and abstract titles, issue cer-
tificates as 10 record title, and provide escrow and 
clOSing services, and other related services, incident 
to issuing title insurance policies to the homeowner 
and mortgagee, but are implicitly excluded from 
drafting deeds and documents necessary to com· 
plete the transaction. Presently in the majority of 
land transactions where title insurance is involved in 
Virginia. the companies do not do their own title 
examinations. The lawyer representing the buyer 
conducts on examir ltion to assure his client of 
good title, then sends a copy of his opinion of title. 
~tating any defects of record, to the title- insuronce 
~ompany which will insure the title. 4 
The possibilities for cost reduction in the code 
section above cited are great. but any opinion ex-
pressed to the buyer as to the legal effect of 
anything in the chain of title by a title company 
would constitute the unauthorized practice of low 
by a loy agency. Nor can any lawyer express on 
opinion as to Ihe 1~!Jal effect of anything in the 
chain of title. or render services such as preparation 
of deeds and other instruments to a client of the lay 
agency. to do so would violate ABA Canon 47.~ 
Although title insurance companies are authar;zed 
to offer escrow and closing services. the standard 
practice wilh larger title companies is to leave 
closing services in the hands of Ihe attorney.' The 
complexities of executi ng deeds of trust. notes. 
financing statements, seller's and purchaser's 
statements, the deed of conveyance. and disbursing 
funds. must be explained by on attorney. qualified 
to answer questions as to their legal effecI. 7 
Aside from the complexities of closing services. 
the some arguments can be made to allow title in-
surance companies to take a greater part in land 
transactions as can be mode for realtors. In 0 simple 
transaction. the legal judgment involved in filling in 
a form deed would be minimal. But the problem still 
exists as to advising a client of the marke'ability of 
title. 
The utilization of the services of paraprofessional 
realtors and title insurers as a cost reduction meons 
is unrealistic for three reasons. First. they demand 
reorganization and reossignment of the parts 
11 
laymen and attorneys play in the land sale process 
as it presently exists. Second, realtors and title com-
panies may be unwilling to take on the increased 
workload of handling simple real estate tran-
sactions, regardless of the increased compensation 
they would receive. Third, the attorney is capable of 
rendering more competent legal advice and services 
for the buyer and seller. 
Another means of reducing the time spent on 
each real estate transaction is the computerization 
of land records and related information. 
Technologically the extent of use of this electronic 
method is limited only by the imagination. A com-
puterized searching system has been developed by 
an abstracting firm in Charlottesville, Title Search, 
Inc., that can simplify the title examination 
problem. Title Search Inc., comprised of laymen, 
having programmed the land records for various 
areas in Charlottesville and Albemarle County in a 
computer, sells computerized abstracts to lawyers. 
In response to a proposal of the Virginia State Bar, 
HUD is financing a similar computerized title 
system in Fairfax County which could result in low 
cost abstracts for lawyers and lower fees for the 
home buyer. 8 The computerized abstracts are an ef-
ficient cost-cutting measure, but it is still necessary 
for a lawyer to examine the abstract and certify the 
title so the buyer can decide whether he wants to 
buy the property and so the title company can 
decide whether the title is insurable. A more 
sophisticated computerized recordation system, kept 
up to date and containing a lawyers opinion as to 
the marketability of every title, could enable lay 
agencies (real estate or title insurance firms) to 
engage in conveyancing where form deeds and the 
computerized abstract would be sufficient. The 
possibility of this happening is foreclosed by a 
1945 opinion by the Virginia Bar Committee on 
Unauthorized Practice of low. A group of Arlington 
lawyers had formed an abstracting firm to search 
titles, act as agent for title insurance companies, 
and negotiate and close property transactions. The 
Committee held thot lawyers employed by the lay 
firm could not advise clients as to the legal effect of 
anything found in a chain of title. 9 It appears that 
computers may provide the optimum solution to the 
cost problem, but certainly not an immediate 
solution since experimentation with this method is in 
an embryonic stage. 
The most. realistic solution for reduction of set-
tlement costs lies in the use of para-legal aides by 
the attorney. laymen, by performing parts of the 
transaction that do not require legal judgment per 
se, such as abstracting, can save the lawyer time 
and the buyer money in urbanized areas of the 
state such as Northern Virginia, where the turnover 
in real estate is substantial. In the smaller cities and 
12 
rural areas of Virginia, where the volume of work 
does not justify hiring a full time abstracter, many 
lawyers have trained their secretaries to search 
titles. tO In the future, these para-legal aides will 
playa large part in reducing costs. Beyond merely 
abstracting titles, there will be increased use of the 
aides in preparing deeds of trust, deeds of release, 
mortgages, and other documents in on un-
complicated transaction. Where the attorney closely 
supervises the work of his lay employee, and adopts 
the work as his own, there would be little danger of 
incompetency, error, or ethics violation as was 
possible in the situation in Commonwealth v. Jones 
and Robins, supra. 
Private litigation and governmental regulation to 
reduce settlement costs to the buyer will inevitably 
result in changes in the conveyancing system to ac-
comodate the reduced fees. Although one possibility 
for change would be to permit realtors and title 
companies to handle uncomplicated transactions, 
the roles they have traditionally played in land 
sales could not be readily changed in light of court 
and Virginia State Bar rulings. By utilizing the ser-
vices of para-legal aides and computerized title-
searching systems, lawyers will hopefully be able to 
meet the demand for low settlement costs in the 
most efficient manner possible. § 
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